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COMMENTS
UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW:
RENEWED;REVAMPED AND REVISITED—
TRADE ACT OF 1974
Since shortly before the turn of this century, the United States
has included countervailing duties in its customs arsenal of protective
instruments with which to neutralize unfair foreign trade practices.'
Trade-distortion in the United States caused by foreign export sub-
sidy schemes, 2 which often give rise to artificial economic advantage in
the penetration of domestic markets, can be effectively offset by this
potent retaliatory device. Yet, use of countervailing duties has been
greatly tempered by the nature of the decision to impose them, as it
implicitly involves our unilateral condemnation of the internal
economic policies of a foreign sovereigns Indeed, countervailing
duties have been characterized recently as "strong medicine, well cal-
culated to arouse violent resentment in countries whose trade prac-
tices are branded as unethical."4 International political considera-
tions have, accordingly, played a significant role in the past adminis-
tration of the countervailing duty statute. 5
With changes in international trade patterns occasioned, at least
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A 1 1 (1947), "the terns countervailing duty (is] understood to mean a special duty
levied to counteract any bounty or subsidy granted, directed or indirectly, upon the
manufacture, production or export of any merchandise." Id. at A24.
Export subsidization schemes usually involve payments or remission of charges,
conferred in an attempt to penetrate markets at a lower product cost than would be
possible in the absence of such payments or remissions. See Butler, Countervailing Duties
and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT't. L. 82,
82-83 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Butler). See also J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GATT 382-87 (1969). For a summary of practices which are generally consid-
ered as subsidies under international standards, see Marks & Malingren, Negotiating
Non-Tariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & Pot.. 1Nri. Bus. 327, 344 n.74 (1975).
See Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Ad-
justments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, I LAW & POL. 1NTI, Bus. 17, 64
(1969) (hereinafter cited as Feller].
' United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A.
1971).
5 See id. ;, Butler,.supra note 2, at 145; King, Countervailing Duties An Old Remedy
With New Appeal, 24 Bus. LAW. 1179, 1191 (1969) ("The Countervailing Duty Statute
vests jurisdiction in Treasury, but 'it remains very much a concern of the State Depart-
ment .. . ."). See also S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE,
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7318 (1974) (legislative history of countervailing duty amend-
ments to the Trade Act of 1974). Even after the 1974 amendments, it appears that the
State Department will continue to take cognizance of countervailing duty problems. See,
e.g., the discussion in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1976, at 2, col. 5 (city ed.), reporting on
Secretary Kissinger's talks with the Brazilian government over the United States' imposi-
tion of countervailing duties on Brazilian leather goods.
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in part, by subsidization practices, domestic industries have shown re-
newed interest in the effective imposition of countervailing duties on
imports.° American manufacturers, producers and labor organizations
have perceived the continued influx of subsidized imports into this
country as a threat to domestic market and job interests.? As a result
of enforcement attempts, a fundamental conflict developed between
those seeking to mitigate, through discretionary administrative prac-
tices, the counterproductive political effects of the imposition of counter-
vailing duties, and those domestic interests seeking to invoke the
statute's compulsory protection.' This conflict has recently been re-
solved through legislative compromise in section 331 of the Trade Act
of 1974.°
This comment will .initially trace the legislative development of
United States countervailing duty law prior to the 1974 amendments.
Problems in the administrative and judicial enforcement history of
this law will next be identified and explored to serve as a framework
for analyzing the significance and probable efficacy of section 331.
The substantive and procedural changes made in the countervailing
duty statute by the Trade Act of 1974 will then be addressed. Finally,
observations on the likely effects of these amendments will be offered,
and shortcomings as well as expanded remedial opportunities for
domestic manufacturers under the new Act will be exposed.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING DUTY
LAW PRIOR TO THE 1974 TRADE ACT
A. Legislative Evolution
United States countervailing duty legislation originated with the
Tariff Acts of 1890'° and 1894," which imposed additional" duties
on imports of sugar from countries paying direct or indirect
°See Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Ways & Means Comm., 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 15, at 5246-53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on the Trade Act of
1974) for a summary of positions advanced by American manufacturers, producers and
labor.
Through the Trade Act or 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2101 et seq. (Supp. 1976), Con-
gress explicitly sought "to provide adequate procedures to safeguard American industry
and labor against unfair or injurious import competition, and to assist industries, firms,
workers, and communities to adjust to changes in international trade flows ...." Id,
§ 2102(4),
° Tariff Act of 1897, ch, 11, 5, 30 Stat. 205. See discussion in text at notes
16-17 infra.
° 19 U.S.C.A. HI 1303, 1516 (Supp. 1976).
'" Ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 584.
" Ch. 349; § 182, 28 Stat. 521.
Prior to the amendments under the Trade Act of 1974, only goods subject to
customs duties were covered by the countervailing duty statutes. Compare 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303 (1970), with 19 U.S.C.A. 1303(a)(3) (Supp. 1976). Traditionally, then, counter-
vailing duties have been duties added to those otherwise applicable..
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bounties" upon exportation." Congress expanded the coverage of
countervailing duties to all dutiable imports in section 5 of the Tariff
Act of 1897." This general countervailing duty statute required the
Secretary of the Treasury to impose countervailing duties whenever a
foreign country "shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty
or grant upon the exportation of any article ... . "16 In all such cases,
the Secretary was instructed to levy, "in addition to the duties other-
wise imposed by this act, an additional duty equal to the net amount
of such bounty or grant Section 5, then, was principally
characterized by its mandatory nature. The section was further
characterized by the extended latitude of its provisions resulting from
the addition of the word "grant,"" and by the absence of any re-
quired finding of injury to a domestic producer or industry as a pre-
condition to the imposition of a countervailing duty. While section 5
did expand the application of countervailing duties to all dutiable
goods, retention of the "otherwise dutiable" requirement also rep-
resented a limitation on the scope of the countervailing duty statute,
since nondutiable goods were thereby excluded from its coverage.
These basic elements remained intact as the cornerstones of United
States countervailing duty law for over three-quarters of a century.
The policy underlying section 5 provisions has been viewed as
essentially "protectionist" in nature." A functional analysis of the
Tariff Act of 1897 suggests that it was designed to serve basically as a
repair mechanism insuring the integrity of United States tariff walls. 20
While foreign export bounties and grants could neutralize regular
protective duties by lowering costs and prices, imposition of counter-
vailing duties on imports equal in amount to such foreign subsidies
effectively reestablished the amount of protection originally accorded.
Protection of domestic industries, then, was to be accomplished
through a combination of high tariffs—imposing duties on those im-
ports thought to pose a threat to American interests—and by the use
of countervailing duties to offset attempted circumvention of our
tariff barriers. As such,, there was no need for proof of injury in
countervailing duty determinations, for a presumption of injury, or
the threat of injury, arose from the very fact that tariff duties were
13
 For judicially adopted constructions of this term, see text at notes 133-35, 142
infra.
" Until 1922, the language of our countervailing duty statute was limited to
bounties or grants paid upon exportation. Compare Ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935-36, with
Ch. 16, § 1V(;), 38 'Stat. 193. While the statutory language was changed in 1922, see
text at note 26 infra, the historic application of the statute has continued to reach only
subsidies directed at exportation, particularly those conferring a trade advantage. Ste
King, supra note 5, at 1180-81, 1190.
1 ° Ch. 11, §5, 30 Stat. 205.
t 6 /d. (emphasis added).
" Id.
'a See text at note 142 infra for a judicial construction of this term.
"See Feller, supra note 3, at 21-22.
so
	at 22.
834
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
charged against the imported merchandise." Since duty-exempt
status, on the other hand, demonstrated that such imported mer-
chandise was either non-competitive, or threatened no domestic in-
terest, bounties or grants provided to such goods by their countries of
origin posed no concern. 22 Foreign subsidies, per se, were not viewed
as inherently threatening. The section 5 countervailing duty provi-
sions were simply designed as remedial instruments to implement a
selectively "protectionist" foreign trade policy.
Section 5 provisions were retained virtually unchanged in the
Tariff Acts of 190923 and 1913,24 and it was not until the Tariff Act
of 1922 that the next significant enlargement in the scope of counter-
vailing duty protection was provided. In section 303 of that Act,"
Congress extended the countervailing duty law's reach to include
bounties or grants on manufacture or production, thereby foreclosing
potential circumvention of the remedy which previously had explicitly
proscribed only subsidies on exportation." This amendment had the
significant practical effect of rendering the countervailing duty law
applicable to any foreign bounty or grant, regardless of whether such
subsidization was specially designed to encourage exportation, or
arose out of legitimate domestic production or fiscal concerns which
only incidentally impacted upon exports." In addition, the 1922 act
broadened the statute to reach bounties or grants provided by a "per-
son, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation."" In over a half
century of practice, however, no countervailing duty has ever been
levied on such private bounties or grants."
The last significant change in American countervailing duty law
prior to the 1974 Act was in section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 3 °
The 1930 Act, while substantially the same as the 1922 Act, permitted
the Secretary of the Treasury to estimate the amount of bounty or
grant. As a result of this explicit statutory grant of power, courts have
felt constrained from reviewing the secretary's estimates once a
21 Id. See Note, The Michelin Decision: A Possible New Direction for U.S. Countervail-
ing Duty Law, 6 LAW & Pot_ 1 NTI. Bus. 237, 242 (1974).
22 See Feller, supra note 3, at 22.
23 Ch. 6. § 6, 36 Stat. 85. This statute added the phrase "provinces and other
political subdivisions," thus extending the statute's reach to bounties or grants provided
through these sources. Id.
"Ch. 16, § IV(E), 38 Stat. 193-94.
25 Ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935.36,
" See text at note 16 supra.
" The imposition of countervailing duties depends upon international trade ef-
fects, regardless of the fact that the foreign actions producing these results were moti-
vated from valid internal economic concerns. Yet, "[Ot should be recognized that coun-
tervailing duty actions amount to a public reproach to the affected government for
promoting 'unfair' competition.... fOine can readily imagine that countervailing on
the basis of a production subsidy might be viewed as interference in the domestic af-
fairs of the exporting country, particularly if the production subsidies neither yield an
appreciable increase in exports, nor were intended to do so." Feller, supra note 3, at 69.
2" Ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935.
29 see Feller, supra note 3. at 33.
39 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303 (Supp. 1976).
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bounty or grant is found to exist," although they have been willing to
entertain challenges as to the existence of a subsidy.32 In close cases,
then, the lack of mathematical certitude as to the exact amount of
foreign subsidization does not of itself prevent a countervailihg duty
determination. This permissible imprecision provided by the power to
estimate serves in practice to broaden the discretion available to the
Secretary of the Treasury in making findings as to the existence of a
bounty or a grant. 33
Section 303 of the 1930 Tariff Act retained existing provisions
under which countervailing duty impositions were applicable regard-
less of whether the merchandise was in a different condition when
imported than when exported, and regardless of whether such goods
were imported directly from the producing country or otherwise.34
Although these provisions offered little guidance as to when the im-
position of countervailing duties was appropriate, they did evidence
the breadth of situations reached by the statute. 35 They also served to
foreclose potential avenues through which countervailing duty protec-
tion might otherwise be circumvented. Finally, the 1930 Act main-
tained the pre-existing requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury
"declare" the net amount of bounties or grants as estimated. 38 No
similar declaratory requirement was imposed, however, with respect to
how such estimates were computed." As a result of the narrowness of
this statutory publication mandate, the reasons supporting administra-
tive countervailing duty determinations have largely escaped examina-
tion by an interested public. 38
Thus, by 1930, the substantive character of United States counter-
vailing duty law had been fully shaped and its contours were pre-
served without modification for over four decades prior to enactment
of the 1974 Trade Act. During the interim period, what did change
was the conceptual framework within which the countervailing duty
law was to function. The protectionist trade policies prevailing at the
enactment of the first general countervailing duty statute gave way to
the liberal, free-trade policies embodied in the General Agreement on
31 See, e.g., V. Mueller & Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354, 360-61 (C.C.P.A.
1940).
"Id. See also Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966).
"But cf. Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 53 C.C.P.A. 36 (1966), in
which the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected the manner in which the
Treasury Department had calculated the amount of the bounty because it was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Id. at 42.
34
 These provisions were first included in our countervailing duty statute in the
Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 205. They have been retained without subse-
quent modification through the 1974 amendments.
33 See Butler, supra note 2, at 97.
38 Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970), with the Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30
Stat. 205.
$7
 V. Mueller Sc Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354, 360 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
33 See text at notes 262-66 infra.
836
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 39 embraced by this country through ex-
ecutive agreement in 1947."
The fundamental substantive divergence between the GATT
and section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 lay in an injury test re-
quirement. Whereas United States countervailing duty law had never
predicated its sanctions on a finding of injury, Article VI, paragraph
6 of the GATT prohibited the imposition of such duties unless a
showing was made that subsidized imports "cause or threaten material
injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to prevent or
to materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry." 41 The
GATT, however, did not subject the Tariff Act of 1930 to any dim-
inution. A "grandfather clause," contained in the Protocol of Provi-
sional Application, provided that signatory countries would apply the
GATT article dealing with countervailing duties "to the fullest extent
not inconsistent with existing legislation."" While the United States
was thus able to preserve section 303 intact, future domestic counter-
vailing duty legislation obviously need acknowledge the international
obligations assumed in the GATT, including the injury requirement."
Between 1951 and 1953, three attempts were in fact made to add an
injury clause to the countervailing duty law; 44 none, however proved
successful." Indeed, it was not until the Trade Act of 1974 that a lim-
ited formulation of the injury test was finally incorporated into
domestic countervailing duty legislation." The provisions embodying
this test will be discussed in Part II of this comment. 47
B. Enforcement History
1. Administrative Practice and Procedure
The countervailing duty laws are enforced by the Treasury De-
partment, primarily through the Customs Service." Proceedings may
be initiated either through information provided by the Customs Ser-
36 61 Stat. All (1947). Countervailing duty provisions may he found in pt. 11,
art. VI (6) of the GATT. 61 Stat, A24 (1947).
4° 12 Fed. Reg. 8863, Proclamation No. 2671 A (1947).
4 ' 61 Stat. A24 (1947) (emphasis added).
" Id. at A2051.
46 Congress did in fact acknowledge the GATT when extending the coverage of
our countervailing duty statute in 1974 to nondutiable imports. See S. REP. No. 1298,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. Cotn CONG. & An. Ni;ws 7186, 7320 (1974).
"See Hearings on H.R. .5106 Before the Howe Ways & Means Comm., 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. 42 (1953); Hearings on H.R. 5505 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1952); Hearings on H.R. 1.535 Before the Howe Way & Means Comm., 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1951).
46 For a discussion of these unsuccessful legislative attempts to harmonize U.S.
countervailing duty law with the GATT, see Feller, supra note 3, at 26; Butler, supra
note 2, at 126-27.
4° 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1303(a)(2), (b)(1) (Supp. 1976). See text at notes 206-11 infra.
n See text at notes 206-22 infra.
" See note 85 infra.
837
BOSTON COI I FOE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
vice to the Commissioner of Customs," or upon complaint by an in-
terested party to any district director or to the Commissioner. 5 ° In
practice, however, investigations were conducted almost solely in re-
sponse to protests from domestic manufacturers. 5 ' While section 303
mandated no statutory hurdle in terms of meeting an "injury test" to
invoke its sanctions, 52 such a test was effectively imposed by the
Treasury Department's selective enforcement of the statute, since pro-
ceedings were not brought absent an injury-provoked complaint." In
this manner, the application of United States countervailing duty law
mitigated the divergence between GATT principles and those em-
bodied in domestic statutes." The executive branch, then, seemingly
sought to harmonize the international obligations it undertook with
the constraints of domestic legislation. 55
No form is explicitly prescribed for a countervailing duty
complaint." Customs regulations simply require a "full statement of
the reasons for the belief "that a bounty or grant is being paid or be-
stowed; "a detailed description or sample of the merchandise;" and a
statement of "all pertinent facts obtainable ...."57
 In practice, this last
provision has been liberally applied by the Treasury Department and,
thus, has posed no procedural obstacle to the filing of a "proper"
complaint. 55 Despite these minimal regulatory requirements relative to
complaints, complainants must present a sufficiently detailed and per-
suasive analysis to warrant an investigation." Furthermore, even if a
complaint met the limited requirements and successfully triggered a
formal inquiry, it still had to demonstrate a very strong case to over-
come Treasury's reluctant posture toward enforcement of the counter-
'° 19 C F.R. §I59.47(a), (c) (1975).
b° 19 C.F.R. 11159.47(6)(1), (c) (1975).
6 ' See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS. SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE
TARIFF AND TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 9151 CONC., 2d SESS., 148 (Comm. Print
1970) (where this practice is acknowledged); Butler, supra note 2, at 127, 129.
as
 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970). This provision has been amended, however, by the
1974 Trade Act, which incorporates a limited injury test for nondutiable items. 19
U.S.C.A. § 1303(a)(2), (b)(1) (Supp. 1976). See text at notes 206-22 infra.
53 See note 51 supra.
54
 Differences nevertheless exist since the GATT requires a showing of material
injury, 61 Stat. A24 (1947) whereas the "injury test" of administrative practice is likely
to be satisfied by a showing of any , injury. Butler, supra note 2. at 127.
as See Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re -emerging Issue in
International Trade, 9 VA. J. INTL L. 82, 127 (1969).
5° Customs regulations refer only io "communications." 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(b)
(1975). See King, Countervailing Duties—An Old Remedy With New Appeal, 24 Bus. LAW
1179, 1190-91 (1969).
zs? 19 C.F.R. §159.47(b)(1) (1975) (emphasis added).
56 See Marks & Malingren, Negotiating Non-Tani Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL
INTL Bus. 327, 365 (1975).
"See 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(c) (1975).
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vailing duty statute. 6°
The key to a section 303 complaint, and to the successfill invoca-
tion of concomitant countervailing sanctions, is found in the concept
of "bounty or grant." While this phrase is at the very heart of the
countervailing duty statute, effective enforcement has historically been
hindered by the lack of a statutory definition." In addition, neither
the legislative history of the various tariff acts, nor the administrative
regulations 62 promulgated pursuant to them, have furnished any di-
rection to those who seek to avail themselves of the section 303 rem-
edy.
Successful invocation of countervailing duties has been further
hindered by the fact that little or no guidance could be gleaned from
administrative practice with respect to what exactly constituted illegal
foreign bounties or grants. 63 Throughout the enforcement history of
our countervailing duty statute, only the fact of the existence of a
bounty or grant, and the amount thereof, are presented in published
Treasury orders." There has been no requirement that the Secretary
of the Treasury elaborate upon the manner in which a particular
bounty or grant was estimated." Nevertheless, the public was forced
to rely upon these published orders to glean evidence of administra-
tive statutory interpretation, since no provision was ever made for the
publication of negative determinations or the reasons for them. 66 This
cc' Customs regulations provide that upon receipt of a complaint, "the Commis-
sioner [of Customs) shall cause such investigation to be made as appears to be war-
ranted by the circumstances of the case." 19 C.F.R. 159.47(c) (1975). See King, supra
note 56, at 1191.
°I "The lack of any statutory definition of a bounty or grant in the statute vests
great discretion in the Secretary of the Treasury .. .." Butler, supra note 55, at 125. See
United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
There can be no doubt that this discretion has been abused in the absence of a defini-
tion, particularly when viewed from the standpoint of the mandatory nature of the law.
See discussion in text at notes 87-92 infra. See also S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 93 U.S. Cone CONG. & AD, NEWS 7186, 7318, 7321 (1975).
°I See• 19 C.F.R. § 159.47 (1975) (formerly 19 C.F.R. 16.24).
ea
	 ON CUSTOMS, TARIFFS AND RECIPROCAL. TRADE AGREEMENTS,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE COMM, ON WAYS & MEANS ON UNITED STATES CUSTOMS, TARIFF,
AND TRADE AGREEMENT LAWS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION, 85TH CONG., iST,SESS. 95
(1957). In the "... absence of any reports from the Treasury Department as to the basis
on which its determinations of the existence of subsidization are made, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to analyze the administration of § 303." Id.
°' For a criticism of this practice, see text at notes 262-68 infra. See also Butler,
supra note 55, at 131-33, 144.
as
	V. Mueller Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354, 360-61 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
" See 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(d) (1975) (issuance of countervailing duty order).
Amendments under the 1974 Trade Act change this practice by statutorily requiring
that "[al determinations by the Secretary ... (whether affirmative or negative) shall
be published in the Federal Register." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(a),(b) (Supp. 1976). It is pos-
sible that an interested party could compel disdosure of the Treasury Department's
reasons in a negative bounty determination situation through suit under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). 5 U.S.C. 1 552 (1970). Cf. NLRB v. Sears, 421 U.S. 132
(1975), where the Supreme Court held that FOIA Exemption 5 relating to "intra-
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failure to publish findings that no bounty or grant existed, coupled
with the paucity of detail and reasoning in Treasury orders issuing
countervailing duties, combined to render attempts to analyze the
administration of section 303 almost impossible, both by those who
sought to invoke the section's remedy, and by Congressional Commit-
tees attempting to review the operation of the countervailing duty
system.'"
Attempts to successfully compel executive enforcement of the
countervailing duty statute were further complicated by the fact that
throughout nearly seven decades of administrative practice, no notice
of Treasury countervailing duty investigations was ever given to the
public. 68 Only recently, as a result of relatively newly promulgated
regulations," have the marshalling of enforcement arguments and
compilation of data been facilitated by the publication of a notice of
complaint in the Federal Register," with an accompanying solicitation
of comments within specified time limits from all interested parties.'"
Now, after consideration of such comments and "other relevant
data,"72 a countervailing duty order or determination—depending
upon whether affirmative or negative findings are made—is pub-
lished in the Federal Register." Nevertheless, a significant short-
coming of previous administrative practice remains under the new regu-
lations, for the underlying rationales of those decisions remain
unpublished. 74
Thus, interested domestic producers and manufacturers, as well
as importers, have had almost no way of knowing which foreign prac-
tices were legal under our countervailing duty law, and only scant
notice as to which were not." Nor has the general public been able to
easily learn why particular foreign practices may or may not have
agency memoranda," 5 U.S.C. § 552b(5) (1970), can never apply to "final opinions," 421
U.S. at 153-54, and that decisions not to file an unfair labor practice complaint with the
NLRB were disclosable "final opinions" made in the adjudication of one case, therefore
falling outside the scope of FOJA Exemption 5. Id. at 155.
67 See note 63 supra.
"See Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border Tax Ad-
justments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, LAW & POU 1N-ri Bus. 17, 39
(1969).
69
 32 Fed. Reg. 13276 (1967), amending 19 C.F.R. § 16.24 (1967) (§ 16.24 was the
forerunner of the present § 159.47).
7° Present regulations require publication of a notice upon receipt of a complaint,
if it is determined that communication is not "patently in error," and contingent upon
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. 19 159.47(c) (1975) (investigation
and notice by the Commissioner). There is no time limit, however, within which publi-
cation of the notice of such complaint must be accomplished. See 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(d)
(1975).
" 19 C.F.R. 159.47(c) (1975).
72
 19 C.F.R. § I59.47(d) (1975). It is possible that "other relevant data" includes
memoranda from the State Department in politically sensitive cases.
" 19 U.S.C.A. 1303(a),(b) (Supp. 1976).
74 See note 64 supra.
7° See text at note 64 supra. The only genuine elucidation in this respect has been
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been found to be legal." There has been no guidance provided by
Congress or executive administrators with respect to the meaning of
the broadly phrased concepts set forth in the statute, and the legiti-
macy of trade schemes potentially encompassed by these concepts. In
the absence of such guidance, the public simply has been left to its
own devices in attempting to discern which foreign practices may be
illegal bounties or grants. It is small wonder then that for decades,
most domestic concerns have resorted to alternative means to protect
themselves from unfair foreign trade practices, 77
 leaving the counter-
vailing duty statute as "the most under administered of all of the
tariff and customs laws." 78
Although interpretative difficulties and lack of public notice ren-
dered section 303 a rather unwieldy protective device, the ineffec-
tiveness of the statutory remedy prior to the 1974 reforms may be
traced primarily to fundamental administrative abuses; 78
 namely,
extreme delays in making findings, an abuse attributable to a near
complete lack of procedural safeguards in official proceedings. 88 Time
is of the essence to a United States industry seeking relief from injury
sustained as a result of' unfair foreign trade practices." However,
provided through judicial opinions. See, e.g., Nicholas v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust.
Apps. 97 (1916), affd, 249 U.S. 34 (1919) (direct subsidy payments); Downs v. United
States, 113 F. 144 (4th Cir. 1902), aff d, 187 U.S. 496 (1903) (tax rebate on exportation);
United States v. Passavant, 169 U.S. 16 (1897) (tax rebate on exportation); V. Mueller &
Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (currency manipulation); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348 (C.C.P.A.1940). The analysis of legal
scholars has also provided considerable clarification in this area. See, e.g., Feller, supra
note 68, at 40.53. Feller lists and describes eight categories of practices incurring coun-
tervailing duties or which are generally regarded as subsidies. Practices included among
these categories are: direct subsidy payments, excessive tax rebates, preferred income
tax treatment, government price support systems, export loss indemnification, subsidies
for specific production and distribution costs, currency manipulation, and unjustified
tax remissions. Id. For further discussion of these categories see Silberger, Trade Act of
1974: New Remedies Against Unfair Trade Practices in International Trade, 5 DENVER. INT'L
L. & Pot.. 77, 104.10 (1975).
76
 See note 266 infra.
"See Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 10, at 3294 (1973) [hereinafter Howe Hearings on the Trade Act of 1974]
(position paper by Magnavox Co.).
78
 Id., pt. 7, at 2169 (remarks of the Trade Relations Council of the U.S., Inc.).
79
 In the hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee on the Trade
Act of 1974, numerous industries protested the delay in enforcement which occurred
under past administrative practice. See id., pt. 3, at 806 (1973) (remarks of the National
Machine Tool Builders Ass'n); id., pt. 10, at 3268 (remarks of the Electronic Indus.
Ass'n); id., pt. 14, at 4752 (remarks of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic
Workers of America); id., pt. 4, at 1225 (remarks of the AFI-C10); id., pt. 7, at 2165,
2168, 2170 (remarks of the Trade Relations Council of the U.S., Inc.).
"See Id.; S. REL'. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186, 7318 (1974).
"' House Hearings on the Trade Act of 1974, supra note 77, pt. 10, at 3269 (remarks
of the Electronic Indus. Ass'n).
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while customs regulations and procedures seemingly imply a prompt
resolution of countervailing duty issues, 82 such was not the enforce-
ment experience. 83
 Indeed, delay in enforcement was not only a
major impediment to obtaining relief under section 303, but was also
probably the greatest deterrent preventing aggrieved domestic indus-
tries from even seeking to invoke the countervailing duty statute."
Prior to the 1974 reforms, countervailing duty legislation lacked a
statutory time limit within which the Treasury Department, through
the Bureau of Customs," was required to act in determining whether
or not a bounty or grant existed." This absence of a time limit ena-
bled the Treasury Department to circumvent the mandatory terms of
the statute. By stretching out and even shelving investigations,'" the
Department exercised what in fact amounted to administrative discre-
tion in imposing countervailing duty sanctions" simply by allowing
section 303 complaints "to gather dust." 88
This executive preference for administrative inaction, especially
in politically sensitive cases, eventually rendered countervailing duty
sanctions too discretionary to be meaningful. While the Treasury
Department's policy was motivated from the standpoint of a legitimate
concern over triggering international economic retaliation," it
nevertheless was grossly abusive of the clear and mandatory nature of
the countervailing duty law." As such, the administrative practice of
de facto discretion brought the section 303 remedy to a point of such
diminished efficacy as to place it virtually "in opposition to the
[statute's] original concept." 92
"See 19 U.S.C. 1303 (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303 (Supp. 1976); 19
C.F.R. 4 159.47(a)-(d) (1975).
85
 See notes 78-79 supra.
84 See id.
85
 19 C.F.R. 1.1 (1975) generally provides for a delegaton of duties by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury to the Customs Service. Countervailing duty determinations are,
in fact, carried out by the Customs Service. See id. 159.47(a)-(d).
"Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970), with 19 U.S.C.A. 4 1303(a)(4) (Supp. 1976).
The customs regulations also made no provision limiting the time for acting on such
determinations. See 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(a)-(d) (1975).
" The legislative history of the Trade Act of 1974 acknowledges the existence of
these practices. S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186, 7318 (1974).
ea See House Hearings on the Trade Act of 1974, supra note 77, pt. 7, at 2165 (re-
marks of the Trade Relations Council of the U.S., Inc.).
" Id. at 2165, 2170.
" The Secretary of the Treasury has acknowledged retaliation as a factor to be
considered in any countervailing ditty imposition. See Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d Sen., pt. I, at 166, pt. 2 at 504 (1974).
" See discussion in text at notes 116-19 infra.
91 House Hearings on the Trade Act of 1974, supra note 77, pt. 14, at 4752 (remarks
of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America).
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2. Judicial Review
a. The Right to Review
American importers have traditionally enjoyed the right to judi-
cially contest countervailing duty assessments in the United States
Customs Court and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals." Such
challenges are brought pursuant to procedures" outlined in section
514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. 95 This section specifies,
inter alia, that "all charges" or exactions of whatever character within
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury..." are subject to
protest by importers or consignees." Written protests under this sec-
tion "[must] be filed within ninety days after but not before [the]
notice of liquidation or reliquidation ...."" Administrative denials of
such protests may then be litigated in United States Customs Court."
From practically the inception of the first general countervailing
duty statute in 1897, importers have litigated denials of their protests
that no bounty or grant existed.'°° It was not until 1967, however,
than an American manufacturer sought, through appeal of a protest
filed under section 516(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 101 to invoke a
"right" to judicial review of negative subsidy determinations. 01 2 I n
United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 103 the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, reversing the decision below,'" concluded that
the Customs Court lacked jurisdiction to review an appeal of a nega-
tive countervailing duty determination.'° 5 Reasoning that section 303
of the Tariff Act of 1930 was penal in character, the court concluded
that countervailing duties or customs penalties were "exactions."'" In
contrast to the sweeping language of section 514 which applies to im-
96 Every countervailing duty case prior to 1967 was brought by an importer. See,
e.g., the cases cited in note 75 supra.
34 Judicial protests pursuant to § 303 must be brought in accordance with 28
U.S.C. ** 2631-32 (1970). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1970) (jurisdiction of the Customs
Court).
96 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1970), amending Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, title IV,
§ 6514, 46 Stat. 734, 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1964).
96 Prior to the 1970 amendment, 1514 had rendered "all decisions" by the Sec-
retary of the Treasury subject to protest. Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, title IV, § 514,
46 Stat. 734, 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1964).
" 19 U.S.C, I514(a)(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
99 19-U.S.C. 1514(b)(2)(A) (1970).
" See note 94 supra.
"° See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903); United States v. Hills
Bros. Co., 107 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1901).
101
 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516 (Supp. 1976).
102
 Hammond Lead Prods., Inc. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 460, 461 (Gust.
Ct. 1969), rev'd, 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
105 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (noted in 4 LAW le POL. INTL Bus. 146 (1972)).
104 306 F. Supp. 460 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
"3 440 F.2d at 1027.
'° 5 1d. at 1028.
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porters and includes "exactions, of whatever character .. ," 1 D 7 section
516(b) limited protests by domestic producers to challenges to "the
classification of, or rate of duty assessed upon, the merchandise."'"
The court concluded from its comparison of the language utilized in
each section that protests of penal duties were outside the scope of
section 516(b), which was limited solely to challenges of regular cus-
toms duties determinations.'" Thus, the court answered negatively
the question of whether section 303 was intended to work in "har-
ness" with section 516(b), so that a domestic manufacturer could "ob-
tain the assessment of countervailing duties by reason of the action of
a foreign government, without the acquiescence of the Treasury De-
partment in the assessment.""° Appeals of negative decisions on sub-
sidy determinations would not be entertained, since as to the jurisdic-
tional issue, "Congress did not intend the courts to impose [a penal
exaction] should the Treasury be recalcitrant .... "111
While the court wrapped its jurisdictional conclusion in the cloak
of congressional, intent, the reasoning advanced to support it rested in
large part upon an underlying policy consideration. In view of the
court's recognition of the international repercussions which may at-
tend impositions of countervailing duties, it was simply unwilling to
allow manufacturers to "bypass" the executive branch and to enlist the
judiciary to define the actions of foreign sovereigns as illegal." 2 In
further recognition of the "penal" nature of section 303 sanctions, the
court acknowledged that the Secretary of the Treasury "does and must
exercise some discretion in defining what acts of foreign governments
confer bounties or grants.. .."" 3 Indeed, it suggested that "[t]he
practical standard [in determining whether section 303 is applicable to
the actions of a foreign sovereign] may well be whether the indirect
bounty seems reasonable or unreasonable in the circumstances."'"
Thus, although a foreign government bestowed a subsidy, the Treas-
ury Department enjoyed moderate latitude in defining whether such
actions constituted bounties or grants for the purposes of actually in-
voking the countervailing duty statute.'" By perceiving the defini-
tional process as a discretionary, political policy determination,'" the
1°7 Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, tit. IV, § 514, 46 Stat. 734.
'n Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, tit. IV, § 516(b), 46 scat. 735. The action was
brought prior to the 1970 amendment to the section, which did not, in any event, affect
the ultimate decision. 440 F.2d at 1031-32.
in See 440 F.2d at 1030. But see id. at 1033-35. (Almond, J., dissenting). See also
the criticism of the majority conclusion advanced in Note, 4 LAW & Pot.. INTL Bus. 146,
198-53 (1972). Cf. Feltex Corp. v. Dutchess Hat Works, 21 C.C.P.A. 463, 472 (1934).
"° 440 F.2d at 1027 (emphasis added).
"I Id. at 1030 (emphasis added).
I" Id. at 1031.
"3 Id. (emphasis added).
" 4 Id. at 1030 (emphasis added).
"5 Id. at 1030-31.
16 Id. at 1031.
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court, in effect, legitimized prevailing administrative practice. This
practice, however, flew in the face of the dear and mandatory lan-
guage of the statute that if a foreign government bestows a bounty or
grant in fact, then countervailing duty sanctions "shall"' 17 be an auto-
matic concomitant. 118 Use of the word "shall" in the language of
section 303 simply did not permit definitional discretion of the sort
posited by the court in Hammond Lead."'"
United States Customs Courts, were thus without jurisdiction to
hear manufacturers' challenges to the Treasury Department's negative
countervailing duty determinations."° In so concluding, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals created' 21 the anomalous situation in which
a question as to the existence of a bounty or grant was justiciable when
presented by an importer, but not so when presented by an American
manufacturer or producer. In the absence of such a right to review, the
mandatory nature of section 303 and its remedial impact were largely
illusory, especially where Treasury continued to be so heavily influenced
by foreign policy considerations in the exercise of its "definitional
discretion." 122 Indeed, these considerations so influenced the Treasury
Department that throughout section 303's enforcement history, the
phrase "bounty or grant" was narrowly construed when politically
expedient. 123 As a direct result, the reach of the "mandatory" countervail-
ing duty statute was significantly limited.'"
In light of the Department's relatively narrow definitional pos-
ture, and the negative subsidy determinations resulting therefrom, the
unreviewability of these determinations took on vastly increased signif-
icance, for no judicial check on executive action existed under these
circumstances. 128 In combination, these factors acted so as to virtually
leave manufacturers without the very remedy the statute was designed
117 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
"" Compare the majority's position on Treasury discretion, 440 F.2d at 1030 with
the mandatory language used in the countervailing duty statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1303
(1970).
IS While the statute's language requires imposition of countervailing duties upon
a finding that a bounty or grant has been paid or bestowed, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970),
the court suggested that "ftlhe practical standard may well be whether the indirect
bounty seems reasonable or unreasonable in the circumstances." 440 F.2d at 1030 (em-
phasis added).
120 440 F.2d at 1027.
1 " The majority in Hammond Lead would contend, quite obviously, that it was
Congress who created the anomaly.
12 ' During an eight year period beginning in 1959, for example, no countervail-
ing duty orders were issued. Indeed, from May I, 1934, through December 31, 1969
there were approximately 200 countervailing duty cases, only 34 of which resulted in
the issuance of countervailing duty orders. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS,
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE TARIFF AND TRADE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 148, (Comm. Print 1970),
1 " See Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 504 (1974).
114 See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. Colo. CONC. &
An. NEWS 7186, 7318, 7321 (1974).
1" See text at notes 105-16 supra and 152 infra.
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to provide.'" It is not surprising, then, that American manufacturers
felt that the Treasury Department's interpretative and administrative
practices had rendered the countervailing duty statute inadequate as a
protective device.'"
b. Bounty or Grant?—judicial Construction
The Treasury Department's administration of the countervailing
duty law has been subject to considerable criticism as based upon an
excessively restrictive interpretation of the phrase "bounty or
grant." 28 American manufacturers, urging a more active use of the
statute, have sought to bring Treasury practice into conformity with
the more liberal reading of the phrase suggested by a number of judi-
cial decisions.'" There is a long line of cases, dating nearly to the in-
ception of the United States countervailing duty law, wherein courts,
upon review of the Treasury Department's determination that a
bounty or grant was paid or bestowed, have held imposition of coun-
tervailing duties justified. 13° The courts in these cases—all based on
appeals by importers from rejected protests—have expressed the gist
of the terms "bounty or grant" in expansive language.
The broadest interpretations of this phrase may be found in two
leading opinions by the Supreme Court dating from the first two de-
cades of this century. In Downs v. United States,"' the Court reviewed
certain laws of Russia which, while imposing a tax on all sugar pro-
duced, remitted the tax upon all sugar exported. These laws also
permitted Russian exporters to obtain, solely on the basis of the ex-
portation of sugar, a certificate from the government which was of
value and salable. 132 In upholding the lower court's rejection of the
importer's protest, the Court elaborated at great length upon the
word "bounty,"•stating:
t26 See note 122 supra.
'" See text at note 77 supra.
18 Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in In-
ternational Trade, 9 VA. J. IN't-L. L. 82, 118 (1969). Domestic critics of the Treasury
Department's administration of the statute sought unsuccessfully, to incorporate a
broad definition of the phrase 'bounty or grant" into the 1974 reforms. See Hearings on
H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 9, at
3097-98 (1973) (suggestion of the Pulp and Paper Mach. Manufacturer's Ass'n); id., pt.
10, at 3296 (suggestion of the Electronic Indus. Ass'n), id., pt. 9, at 3075, 3079-80 (sug-
gestion of the Am. Retail Fed'n).
' 29 Id. See text at notes 135-34, 142 infra.
In See cases cited in note 75 supra.
13 ' 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
in
 For a thorough analysis of the Downs decision, see Note, The Michelin Decision:
A Possible New Direction for U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 6 LAW & POL. iNri. Bus. 237,
243-46 (1974). •
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A bounty is defined by Webster as "a premium of-
fered or given to induce men to enlist into the public service;
or to encourage any branch of industry, as husbandry or
manufacturers." And by Bouvier, as "an additional benefit
conferred upon or a compensation paid to a class of
persons."' 33
The Court also took judicial notice of a definition advanced in an
1898 conference of European powers in Brussels on sugar bounties.
Under this definition, bounties encompassed "... all the advantages
conceded to manufacturers and refiners by the fiscal legislation of the
states, and that, directly or indirectly, are borne by the public
treasury.... [including] [t]he total or partial exemptions from tax-
ation granted to a portion of the manufactured products.'" 34 In lan-
guage which parallels in breadth the Brussels definition, the court
suggested that:
[w]hen a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is
remitted upon all sugar exported, then, by whatever pro-
cess, or in whatever manner, or under whatever name it is
disguised, it is a bounty upon exportation.'"
Some sixteen years later, the Supreme Court in Nicholas & Co. v.
United Statesim addressed the distinction between the terms "bounty"
and "grant."'" In Nicholas, the Court examined the question of
whether a British law, which provided for a payment to distillers on
the export of spirits, constituted a bounty or grant. 138 In affirming
the decision of the Court of Customs Appeals,'" the Court con-
cluded that the government payments were "grants" upon
exportation.'" These payments were, therefore, subject to counter-
vailing duties, since they sought to provide an inducement to distillers
to seek foreign markets.' 4 ' In so concluding, the Court made clear the
liberal coverage intended by Congress in the countervailing duty law,
indicating that:
Mlle statute was addressed to a condition and its words
"3 187 U.S. at 501.
13 ' Id. at 501-02.
'" Id. at 515. Considerable debate exists as to whether this language is holding or
dicta. See Note, supra note 132, at 244-48 which concludes that the language is dicta. Id.
at 248. Accord, Hammond Lead, 440 F.2d at 1030. But see American Express Co. v.
United States, 332 F. Supp. 191, 198 (Cust. Ct. 1971), affd on other grounds, 472 F.2d
1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973) for authority that the statement is holding. Upon review in
Hammond Lead the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals specifically left this question
open. 472 F.2d at 1057.
138 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
137 See also Allen v. Smith, 173 U.S. 389, 402 (1899) (definition of the term
'bounty").
' 3" 249 U.S. at 36-37, 39.
139 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97 (1916).
1 " 249 U.S. at 39-40.
'" Id. at 40.
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must be considered as intending to define it, and all of
them—"grant" as well as "bounty"—must be given effect. If
the word "bounty" has a limited sense the word "grant" has
not. A word of broader significance than "grant" could not
have been used. Like its synonyms "give" and "bestow," it
expresses a concession, the conferring of something by one
person upon another. And if the "something" be conferred
by a country "upon the exportation of any article or mer-
chandise" a countervailing duty is required .. . 142
The language of these two Supreme Court decisions illustrates
the broad and comprehensive meaning to be given to the phrase
"bounty or grant." Such an all-inclusive interpretative approach to the
concept of foreign subsidization would seemingly be most efficacious
in giving substance to congressional purpose, for "[i]t was a resuh
Congress was seeking to equalize [by countervailing] regardless of
whatever name or in whatever manner or form or for whatever pur-
pose [such aid or advantage was provided]." 43 Thus, as suggested in
the lower court decision in Nicholas, "[t]he sole inquiry is, do the re-
sults of such acts stimulate exportation or give a special advantage by
affording aid from the public treasury whereby such goods may when
exported be sold in competition with ours for less."'" The courts,
then, have looked to the facts and trade effects of foreign actions in de-
termining whether a bounty or a grant exists.' 45 The concern of the
courts has been with trade results, however incidental or indirect, and
not with intentions or international repercussions.'" In stark contrast,
the Treasury Department has not been so mechanical in its adminis-
trative decisions. Unlike the courts, which have not felt at liberty to
adopt "constrained" definitions of the words "bounty or grant," 47 the
Treasury Department, in the exercise of its "definitional discretion,"
has looked beyond the trade results of foreign actions to their motiva-
tion and to possible repercussions attendant upon any finding of il-
legal subsidy.'"
While such administrative practice certainly was rationally
based—indeed, it seems well calculated to save the United States from
1421d, at 39.
Ha
 Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cost. App. 97, 106 (1916) (emphasis
added), affd, 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
'" 7 Ct. Cust. App. at 107.
145 1d.; accord, F.W. Woolworth Co. v.. United States, 115 F.2d 348, 354 (C.C.P.A.
1940).
'" One commentator suggests that the courts have looked primarily to whether
foreign actions confer a trade advantage when examining the results of such actions. See
King, Countervailing Duties—An Old Remedy With New Appeal, 24 Bus. LAW. 1179, 1190
(1969).
'" Nicholas & Co. v, United States, 7 Ct. Cust. App. 97, 106 (1916), affd, 249
U.S. 34 (1919).
"8 See Hearings on H,R. 10710 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 504 (1974); Hammond Lead, 440 F.2d at 1030, 1031.
848
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
potential international embarrassment and disadvantageous economic
repercussions' 4 "—it did not serve to effectuate and, in all likelihood,
actually impeded the fulfillment of congressional purpose 15 °—as
clearly expressed in the broad statutory mandate.' 5 ' It would seem,
then, that the expansive interpretation given the phrase "bounty or
grant" in judicial dicta, more accurately reflects congressional intent
and the true spirit of the countervailing duty law. Treasury's failure
to embrace this expansive construction has likely resulted in negative
bounty determinations, many of which have no doubt been based
largely on political policy considerations having little or nothing to do
with the language of the statute.
c. Justiciability: A New Remedy for an Old Problem
While the court, in Hammond Lead concluded only that the
Customs Court lacked jurisdiction to review negative bounty determina-
tions, the plain import of the decision was to foreclose protests by
American manufacturers to the judiciary regarding countervailing
duties. 152 Yet, faced with the prospect of a continuing surge of
bounty-fed imports into their home markets, domestic manufacturers
were not. content to let customs decisions—or the lack of decisions—
go unchallenged, especially where executive action or inaction favored
foreign manufacturing interests and importers. The first judicial chal-
lenge attempted after Hammond Lead came three years later in
National Milk Producers Federation v. Shultz. 153
The plaintiff in National Milk sought a writ of mandamus in fed-
eral district court to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to act on a
complaint which had "gathered dust" for five years.' 54 In rejecting a
motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, 155 the district court took
cognizance of the decision in Hammond Lead which had left American
manufacturers without a remedy in Customs Court."° As there was
no right of protest pursuant to section 516, the exclusive statutory
grant of jurisdiction to the Customs Court.'" was rendered inop-
erative, since it is expressly conditioned upon the availability of review
14" Hammond Lead, 440 1 7 .2c1 at 1031.
14" See S. Rilp. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. Cone. CONS. &
An. News 7186, 7318, 7321, (1974).
14 ' See text at notes 116-19 supra.
`" See National Milk Producers Fed'n v. Shultz, 372 F. Stipp. 745, 746 (D.D.C.
1974).
I" 372 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1974).
' 64 1d. at 746,
' 55 14. at 747. The motion to dismiss was also advanced - on the ground of lack of
standing. Id. at 747-48. The court rejected the motion, indicating that plaintiff had al-
leged an injury in fact, and claimed an interest within the zone of interests protected
under the countervailing duty statute, thus satisfying applicable standing requirements.
Id. at 748.
146 See text at notes 105-11 supra.
'" 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1970).
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from denials of "protests [filed] pursuant to the Tariff Act of
1930 ...."'" The court, therefore, reasoned that the very unavail-
ability of an action based upon section 516 served to confer jurisdiction
upon district courts to hear manufacturer protests with regard to
countervailing duty issues.' 59 Additionally, the court concluded that
since section 303 imposed no time limits, the mandamus statutel" was
a proper alternative ground for its jurisdiction in a suit against the
Treasury Department to force compliance with Tariff Act
requirements.' 6'
The National Milk decision reopened the doors of judicial review
which had been slammed shut to domestic manufacturers in Hammond
Lead. The decision held out the promise that there might finally be
judicial redress through mandamus from the abusive use of execu-
tive inaction which had so crippled attempts to invoke section 303
sanctions.'" Even prior to the reforms of the 1974 Trade Act, then, it
appeared that limits were to be drawn upon the Treasury's freedom
of action in countervailing duty determinations. With such a potent
weapon as mandamus seemingly available to compel action, the
Treasury Department was likely to feel constrained from continuing
to utilize unreasonably long delays in the investigation process in
order to avoid the political and economic impact of positive bounty
determinations.'" Investigative activity was, accordingly, likely to
increase.'" As a result, the issue as to the nature of the determina-
tions process was bound to take on renewed significance, since the
Department's "definitional discretion" would be its sole remaining pol-
icy tool with which to avoid strained international economic relations
arising from imposition of countervailing duties.
d. Nature of the Bounty Determination Process
The court in Hammond Lead had characterized administrative
bounty determinations as involving judgments that are essentially
political and of a policy-making nature.'" As such, the court felt that
section 303 contemplated the exercise of executive discretion in defin-
ing what sort of actions by foreign governments constitute indirect
"8 372 F. Supp. at 746, quoting 28 U.S.C. 1582 (1970).
"8 372 F. Supp. at 746 ("Since § 1582 is the only statutory grant of jurisdiction to
the Customs Court respecting review of import charges, its unavilability acts to confer
original jurisdiction upon this court under 28 U.S.C. § 13407).
1 " 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). This section provides: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the
plaintiff." Id.
16 ' 372 F. Supp. at 747.
n's See note 79 supra.
' 63 See Marks & Malingren, Negotiating Non-Tanff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAw & POL
INTL Bus. 327, 361 (1975).
154 id.
1 " 440 F.2d at 1030-31.
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bounties or grants.1°6 Given this characterization, questions arose as to
whether countervailing duty determinations might be more appro-
priately characterized as rule-making rather than adjudicative activity
for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 187 Prior to
the Hammond Lead decision, one legal commentator had concluded
that although "the determination of the existence of a bounty has
characteristics of both an order and a rule... , "168
 Treasury decisions
were adjudications within the meaning of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.' 69
 This conclusion ' presupposed, however, that the determina-
tion that a bounty exists is not a matter of agency discretion; that is,
a decision which is essentially policy-making in nature.' 7° In light of
the decision in Hammond Lead, this presupposition was obviously open
to attack. Resolution of this issue 'portended significant consequences
for the reviewability of Treasury's negative bounty determinations,
since the APA excludes judicial review' of "agency action ... commit-
ted to agency discretion by laws."'"
In American Express CO. v. United States, 172
 the contention was ad-
vanced that a Treasury countervailing duty determination was invalid
"because its promulgation constituted a rule-making activity within the
purview of the APA that was carried out `without compliance with the
procedural requirements of ... [that Act] and of the Customs
Regulations.' 473
 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals disa-
greed, however, concluding that determinations under section 303
were not rule-making under the APA. 174
 Treasury's countervailing
duty decisions were viewed as more clearly resembling orders,'" since
"once it has been determined that a bounty exists, the Secretary has
no discretion but to levy the appropriate countervailing duty. „I76
While this conclusion went to the nature of Treasury's decision, it did
not address the issue of the decisional process, and what discretion, if
any, there was available to the Secretary. The court did, however,
make a finding on this point, stating that "an investigation for the
"6 Id.
167 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
145 ° Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in In-
ternational Trade, 9 VA..). INTL L. 82, 131 n.240 (1969).
' 60 Id. at 130.
" 0 /d. at 140-41.
In See 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2) (1970). Positive bounty determinations would never-
theless be subject to judicial review, since such review of importer protests was provided
for by statute. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1970), 28 U.S.C. 1582 (1970).
I” 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
"5 Id. at 1055 (bracketed material contained in original) (citation omitted from
original).
'" Id. at 1055-56.
175 See id. at 1055, 1056. The APA defines an "order" as "the whole or a part of a
final disposition, whether affirmative (or] negative, ... of an agency in a matter other
than rule-making ...." 5 U.S.C. * 551(6) (1970). Definitions of "rule" and "rule-
making" are set out at 5 U.S.C. * 551(4), (5) (1970). An adjudication, under the Act, is
the "agency process for the formulation of an order." 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1970).
"° 472 F.2d at 1056.
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purpose of determining the existence of a bounty is in the nature of a
fact-finding activity rather than rule-making."'"
The American Express court's finding with respect to the deci-
sional process suggests that the Secretary of the Treasury must look
solely to evidentiary facts in determining whether or not a bounty or
grant exists, and not to policy-making conclusions to be drawn from
those facts as in rule-making.' 78 This finding that the definitional
process is adjudicative in nature, that is, "concerned with issues of fact
under stated law,""" harkens the return to a result-oriented determina-
tion process of the sort envisioned in the early judicial pronounce-
ments on the countervailing duty statute.'" As such, it also effectively
represents a repudiation of the administrative practice of giving con-
siderable weight to political policy considerations in the definitional
process' 8 '—a practice which had met with favorable judicial comment
only two years before in Hammond Lead. 182
The decisions in National Milk and American Express evidenced a
growing attempt by the judiciary to remedy the erosion of counter-
vailing duty law brought about by administrative abuses. American manu-
facturers, however, were unwilling to entrust their quest for effective
protection solely to the uncertain vehicle of litigation. Arguments in
favor of significant reforms in the countervailing duty law were also
pressed before both houses of Congress.' 83 A political solution was
thus sought for what many had viewed as essentially a political ques-
tion. Legislative resolution of the most pressing issues arising under
the countervailing duty statute was provided by the Trade Act of
1974. 184 In this Act, revisions in customs practice were integrally
linked to a comprehensive congressional reformation of the
framework for the conduct of United States foreign trade policy.
II. COUNTERVAILING DUTY REFORMS UNDER THE TRADE ACT OF
1974
The Trade Act of 1974 made several significant changes in
American countervailing duty law. Section 331 restructures the opera-
"7 1d. (emphasis added).
"R See id.
"0
 Id. at 1055.
18° See text at notes 143-46 supra.
In There were apparently no such policy considerations involved in the
Treasury's decision in this case, see 1 Gust. Bull. 212 (1967) (T.D. 67-102), 472 F.2d at
1056-57, or perhaps more accurately, no overriding policy considerations. See 472 F.2d
at 1052.
188 440 F.2d at 1030-31. But see id. at 1033-35 (Almond, J., dissenting). It is in-
teresting to note that Judge Almond, who vigorously dissented from the majority posi-
tion in Hammond Lead, authored the decision in American Express.
"3 See Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 15, at 5246-53 (1973). See generally Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong„ 2d Sess. (1979).
184 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1303, 1516 (Supp. 1976).
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don of the law in an attempt to balance the executive brrich's desire
for flexibility in application of the statute, with the need for effective
protection of domestic interests.'" In framing the substantive and
procedural amendments to sections 303 and 516 of the Tariff Act of
1930, Congress sought to meet the wide-spread criticisms regarding
the past administration of the Act." 6 The resulting reforms reflect a
two-fold concern on the part of Congress: (1) to assure an effective
domestic remedy against trade-distorting foreign export subsidies
through new procedural guidelines fashioned "to tighten the ad-
ministration of the countervailing duty law;" 1 B 7 and (2) to promote at
once the establishment of "internationally acceptable rules and proce-
dures governing the use of subsidies and imposition of countervailing
duties," while providing sufficient flexibility in the statute so as not to
jeopardize international negotiations contemplated under the Act.'"
A. The Amendments
1. Time Limits on Procedures
The new countervailing duty section provides for publication of
a notice in the Federal Register by the Secretary of the Treasury upon
commencement of a formal investigation to determine the existence
of a bounty or grant.'" As in the past, such investigations may be
triggered by information provided through customs or upon the filing
of a complaint.'" While the legislative history does not address the
historical lack of Treasury-initiated investigations, all new time limits
are framed in reference to situations in which an investigation is
brought absent a private complaint."' Thus, it may be concluded that
Congress acted in the belief that the duty imposed upon the Secretary
to bring its own investigations would in fact be complied with. It re-
mains to be seen whether administrative practice will be in accordance
with this obligation.
185 S. Ree. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7186, 7318-19, 7321 (1975).
' 88 1d. at 7318.
'" Id. at 7320.
nth Id. at 7321 (emphasis added).
1 " 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(a)(3) (Supp. 1976).
150 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(a) (3) (A)-(B) (Supp. 1976). This section of the statute, as
finally enacted, represents a change from the House version of the bill, which would
have imposed the outer time limits from the date of publication of the notice initiating
the formal investigation. See S. Rev. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S.
CODE. CONG. & An. NEWS 7186, 7319 (1974). The House version, however, would have
opened up the possibility of administrative abuse, since there was no time limit imposed
by statute or regulation within which it was necessary to publish the notice after review-
ing the complaint. The Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute raised this very point at hearings
on the bill. See Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Ways & Means Comm., 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 12, at 4089 (1973). The amendment as finally enacted, then, is illustrative
of the lengths to which Congress went in attempting to prevent circumvention of the
new procedures by the Treasury Department.
10 ' See, e.g., 19 U.S.C.A. 1303(a) (3) (A)-(B), (a)(4) (Supp. 1976).
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Regardless of increased administrative activity, however, private
complaints will remain the obvious tool for triggering formal
investigations. These complaints must meet reasonable standards im-
posed by the Secretary.'" Customs regulations currently retain the
standard of presenting "all pertinent facts obtainable ...." 193 Whereas
past practice placed a liberal constuction on this phrase, it is obvious
ithat it is equally susceptible to a stricter nterpretation. Such an in-
terpretation would Create the possibility that the regulations would be
applied so as to avoid both time limits and initiation of an investiga-
tion. However, when Congress authorized the Secretary to issue regu-
lations, it seemingly took this possibility into account. The . legislative
history explicitly states that standards are to be "utilized for the pur-
pose of assuring that the Secretary has sufficient information in order
to .determine whether or not to proceed, and not for the purpose of
evading the time limits established ...."'" Toward the legitimate end
of obtaining adequate information, the Secretary may return a private
complaint with a request for additional information, but this must be
done "promptly" and with "detailed written advice as to the respects in
,which [the complaint] does not conform [with the regulations]."'"
Hopefully, the Treasury Department will comply with these standards
of administrative behavior. In the event that it does not, a mandamus
suit.in federal district court might be an appropriate tool by which to
compel Treasury to honor them.'"
The prime motivation for an enforcement-reluctant Treasury
Department to refuse complaints arises from the new outer time limits
placed on its bounty or grant determination process.'" From the date
that a formal notice of investigation is published regarding a
Treasury-initiated study, or in the more likely alternative, from the
date of filing of an acceptable private complaint, the Secretary has six
months within which to make a preliminary determination as to the
existence of a bounty or a grant, and twelve months within which to
make a final determination.'" These time limits are not activated,
however, until a "proper" petition is filed.' 99 Thus, the easiest way to
avoid triggering these limits is to increase the qualitative standard by
which the acceptability of complaints is governed. While the customs
regulations do provide for an explanation of the complaint's defi-
"?..See' S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186, 7319 (1974) (emphasis added). See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. 159.47 (b)-(d)
(1975).
193 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(b) (1) (iii) (1975).
'" S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE COND. & An.
NEWS 7186, 7319 (1974).
I" 19 C.F.R. § 159.47(b) (2) (1975) (emphasis added).
'" See text at notes 160-61 supra and notes 237-42 infra.
1 " 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(a)(4) (Supp. 1976).
' 08 id.
igg Id.	 I303(a) (3) (A) (Supp. 1976). See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. & News 7186, 7319 (1979); 19 C.F.R. § I 59.47(b) (1975).
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ciencies,20° this process cannot avoid but have a delaying and perhaps
discouraging impact upon those seeking to invoke the statutory remedy.
Although the statute sets out "maximum" time limits, the legisla-
tive history reveals that Congress fully expects that the Secretary
could and "should" make his final determination as to the existence of
a bounty or grant whenever sufficient evidence exists to make such a
determination."' Thus, Congress adopted the six and twelve month
periods as outer time limits, and fully expected expeditious determi-
nations whenever possibte. 202 Regardless of when the preliminary and
final determinations are made, publication of all decisions in the Fed-
eral Register is mandatory although no reasons need be given, 2°3
Upon such publication, the new amendments to section 303 provide
for immediate application of countervailing duties. 204 This stepped-up
application of the duties advances by nearly two months the effective
date of countervailing duty orders, since Treasury practice prior to
the 1974 Act perfected such orders some thirty days after publication
in the Customs Bulletin. 205
2. Duty-Free Merchandise
In the first significant substantive amendment to United States
countervailing duty law since 1922, Congress extended the reach of
the statute to encompass duty-free articles. 206 Countervailing duties
may not be imposed on such merchandise, however, absent an affirm-
ative finding . by the United States International Trade Corn-
70° 19 C•F.R. § 159.47(b)(2) (1975).
sot S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sen., reprinted in 93 U.S. Cone Cow, & AD.
NEWS 7186, 7319 (1974) (emphasis in original).
2" Id. Through early 1976, the Treasury Department has largely taken advan-
tage of the full six month period for preliminary determinations. See, e.g., the following
notices of preliminary countervailing duty determinations issued in June, 1975, approx-
imately six months after the publication of the initial notice of receipt of countervailing
duty petitions: 40 Fed. Reg. 27498 (1975) (canned hams and shoulders from the
member states of the European Economic Community); id. at 27498 (ferrochrome from
S. Africa), 27499 (float glass from France); id. at 27498 (float glass from the United
Kingdom); id. at 27498 (float glass from W. Ger.); id. at 27499 (leather handbags from
Brazil); id. at 27500 (oxygen sensing probes from Canada). In contrast, Treasury prac-
tice with regard to final determinations seems to be in keeping with Congress' expecta-
tion that decisions be expedited whenever possible. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 23899 (1975)
(shoes and steel products from the member states of the European Economic Commu-
nity); id. at 23899 (woven tie fabrics from Japan, W. Ger., and S. Korea); id. at 54447
(cast iron soil pipe and fittings from India); id: at 56697 (float glass from France).
4 °3
 The Trade Act of 1974 provides that "[al determinations by the Secretary
under this section ... (whether affirmative or negative) shall be published in the Fed-
eral Register." 19 U.S.C.A. 1303(a)(6) (Supp. 1976).
B04 Seea 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(c) (Supp. 1976) (application of affirmative determina-
tion); S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7186, 7320 (1974).
"3 S. REP. No. 1298, 93c1 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7186, 7320 (1974).
2" 19 U.S.C.A. { 1303(a)(2) (Supp. 1976).
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mission 207 that a domestic industry is "being or is likely to be in-
jured, or is prevented from being established ...." 2" Congress per-
ceived the inclusion of this injury standard as appropriate in light of
the Article VI requirement of the GATT, which conditions the levy-
ing of countervailing duties on subsidized imports upon a finding of
material injury. 209
 While section 303's coverage of dutiable items pre-
dated GATT and as such fell within its "grandfather clause" exemp-
tion from the injury test, an extension of such coverage to nonduti-
able goods was not covered by the exemption. 21 ° Congress, therefore,
felt compelled to subject nondutiable items to an injury test. 2 "
Several related problems may arise, however, in the delineation
and application of the injury test. While framed in terms of injury to
an "industry," the statute fa Is to define the concept of industry. The
legislative history suggests that a broad reading of the term is war-
ranted, since the discussion of injury is framed in reference to "a
domestic producer .... "212 This would seem to indicate that Congress
contemplated that the Trade Commission need not consider the entire
industry, but only a portion thereof, in determining whether an injury
has, in fact, been suffered. 2 3 Such a standard represents a departure
from the international rule under the GATT, where an injury to the
whole industry is required."'
A second problematic aspect of the new injury test is the fact
that neither the statute nor its legislative history delineates the criteria
for establishing injury.2 t 5 The standard under the GATT is material-
"'The Trade Act of 1974 changed the name of the United States Tariff Com-
mission to the United States International Trade Commission. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2231(a)
(Supp. 1976). All references in any law, order, regulation, etc. to the United States
Tariff Commission are now considered torefer to the International Trade Commission.
Id, at § 2231(b).
2" 19 U.S.C.A. 1303(b)(A) (Supp. 1976). Under the statute, the finding as to in-
jury must be completed by the Commission within three months of Treasury's final
bounty determination. Id. The injury requirement on non-dutiable goods is only re-
quired so long as necessitated by our international obligations under GATT. Id. at
§ 1303(a)(2).
"El S. REP. No, 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. Com:
 CoNc.. & AD.
NEWS 7186, 7320 (1974).
210
 See text at notes 41-43 supra.
2" S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7186, 7320 (1974).
212
 See id.
213
 The American Importers Association had specifically advocated adoption of a
broader rule, suggesting that "Din determining whether an industry is suffering serious
injury, the [Treasury Department) should be required to consider the entire industry
and not just a portion thereof." See Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Ways &
Means Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 768 (1973).
2" See Group Of Experts on And-Dumping & Countervailing Duties, GATT
Document 11963 at 10, 2 April 1959. See generally J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW of GATT, 424-26 (1969).
212
 Some domestic concerns had pressed for the establishment by Congress of
criteria for demonstrating injury. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Ways
& Means Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 12, at 3967 (1973) (remarks by the American
Iron and Steel Institute).
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ity; only upon proof of a "material" injury to the domestic industry
does the GATT authorize countervailing duties. 216
 Federal regulations
suggest that a potentially different standard may be applied under the
Trade Act of 1974. The Trade Commission will proceed beyond a
preliminary inquiry only where there is a "good and sufficient reason
for a full investigation ... [and accompanying public hearing]. "217
Customs regulations set forth requirements which a complaint must
meet in order to be deemed "properly filed," and among them is the
requirement that there be an allegation of "substantial injury."2 " How-
ever, since no standard is provided by which the "substantiality" of an
injury is to be judged, it is difficult to ascertain which allegations will
prove "good and sufficient." It will in all likelihood be left to the
courts, then, particularly in the case of negative determinations, to
carve out such a standard on a case by case basis.
In practice, the International Trade Commission seems to have
adopted a very strict injury standard, for it is framed in reference to
an industry, rather than to the complaining individual producer and
others similarly situated. 2 " This appears to be at variance with the
congressional intent that injury to a portion of an industry be suffi-
cient for the purpose of invoking the statute's protection. 22 ° The
Commission's standard on its face, then, apparently imposes a far
more substantial hurdle to the domestic manufacturer than was ever
legislatively contemplated. There are but two probable explanations
for the Commission's actions in framing such a stringent standard.
First, if there is no practical difference between the Commission's
"substantial" and the GATT's "material" injury to an entire industry
tests, then the Commission has merely sought to harmonize the injury
standard with that which is internationally accepted. Although such
action would seem to be at variance with congressional intent, it would
at least reflect an interpretation to which the actual statutory language
is susceptible. If in fact the Commission did intend to embrace the in-
ternational standard, then a regulation based upon "material" rather
than "substantial" injury would have more clearly reflected that intent.
Use of the word "substantial" in its stead, however, suggests a second
approach to injury determinations which is considerably stricter than
that existing under the international standard with respect to an in-
dustry. Given such an approach, imposition of this exacting standard
would likely spring from yet another attempt by the executive branch
to administratively frustrate the use of countervailing duties as a rem-
1" 61 Stat. A 24 (1947). See text at note 41 supra.
" 7
 19 C.F.R. § 203.3 (1975) (U.S. International Trade
Inquiry). Provision for a public hearing is made in 19 C.F.R. §
"" 19 C.F.R. § 203.2(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
2" See 19 C.F.R. § 203.2(7)(i) (1975).
5 " Compare 19 C.F.R. § 203.2(b)(7)(1) (1975), with S. REP.
Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 7186, 7320
212-13 supra.
Commission Preliminary
203.5 (1975).
No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d
(1974). See text at notes
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edy for unfair trade practices.
Regardless of which approach motivated the International Trade
Commission, neither would seem to be consistent with congressional
intent that there need only be injury to a portion of an industry. It
thus remains to be seen whether a "substantial" injury to an industry
test can withstand judicial challenge. Much will depend upon the
manner in which the test is actually applied. If it is liberally adminis-
tered, no cause for challenge will likely arise. If the test is applied
strictly, however, resulting in an inordinate number of negative injury
determinations, the matter will no doubt be litigated.
The key to the regulation, as with the statute, apparently lies
with the construction given to "industry." If the Commission ., in prac-
tice, hinges its injury finding on substantial injury to the entire in-
dustry, the standard should arguably fall if challenged. If, on the other
hand, the Commission adopts a construction of "industry" consistent
with the legislative history—that is, substantial injury to a portion of
an industry—then the test would not only withstand challenge, but
would make sense in practice as well. Under such a construction, the
"substantial" injury test would serve to mitigate the current divergence
between United States countervailing duty law and the GATT stand-
ard of material injury to an entire industry. It would also more nearly
approximate international practice under the material injury stand-
ard. Contemporary practice has not only related findings of material
injury to an industry's total output, but has also permitted such a find-
ing where complaining individual firms or producers represent a sub-
stantial portion of an industry. 221 Movement toward harmonization of
our domestic practices with the international standard as well as prac-
tice would seem particularly appropriate in light of Congress' admit-
ted deference to the GATT in establishing an injury test for nonduti-
able goods. 222
 Such a construction of the International Trade
Commission's regulation would also sufficiently limit the availability of
the countervailing duty remedy to a single firm within a large in-
dustry, so as to prevent the standard from becoming essentially
"protectionist" in character223—an approach wholly alien to the liberal
trade policies of the GATT.
Dutiable items remain exempt from an injury test under the
1974 amendments. 224
 Past criticism levied at the absence of an injury
requirement has suggested that the imposition of a countervailing
duty absent injury makes no practical sense, since it penalizes domes-
tic consumers through higher prices, while confering no correspond 7
See Group of Experts on Anti-Dumping & Countervailing Duties, GAIT
Document L/963 at 10, April 2, 1959.
"'See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE LONG.  &
An. NEWS 7186, 7320 (1979).
"3 See text at notes 295-97 infra.
3" Compare 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(a)(1) (Supp. 1976), with Ch. 356, (1303, 42 Stat.
835-36, 19 U.S.C. 1303 (1970).
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ing protective benefit to a domestic industry. 225 In principle, it would
seem that if all goods—dutiable• or nondutiable—are to be subject to
countervailing duties, then the imposition of an injury test should not
be contingent upon the status of the goods. If it makes sense to assess
countervailing duties where there is injury to domestic interests then
the standards under which such duties are assessed should be un-
iform. In practice, it can be argued that no anomaly exists with re-
spect to countervailing duty assessments since section 303 proceedings
with respect to dutiable goods are only brought upon complaints,
which normally arise where injury is, in fact, experienced."' As a
matter of principle, it may also be argued that dutiable status itself
represents a judgment that such imported goods would cause injury
absent customs assessments. 227 Thus, it may be concluded that a de
facto injury test does exist with respect to dutiable goods. Accepting
such arguments, however, it is still likely that an anomalous situation
between dutiable and nondutiable merchandise would arise, since the
standards applied to the "injury" determination may well vary in ac-
cordance with the status of the goods involved. 228 To eliminate this
anomaly, uniformity, in practice as well as in principle, would seem
desirable.
During the course of hearings on the Trade Act of 1974, a
number of domestic advocates argued in favor of uniformity in the
countervailing duty law through the extension of an injury test to
dutiable items. 72" Congress, while failing to extend an injury test to
such goods, did acknowledge that the United States will likely move
toward such uniformity in negotiations during the current round of
international fair trade talks. 23° In anticipation of the full harmoniza-
tion of United States countervailing duty law with existing interna-
tional standards for imposing such duties, Congress expressed its ex-
pectation that any concession by the United States with regard to the
injury test on dutiable items would be met with equivalent concessions
by other nations. 23 ' Thus, while recognizing the rationality of the un-
SS5 See, e.g., Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies, Border
Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, I LAW & POL. INTL Bus.
17, 25 (1969); Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Reemerging Issue in
International Trade, 9 VA. J. INTL L. 82, 12-7 (1969). See also Hearings on H. 6767 Before.
the Howe Comm. on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 995 (remarks of Cater
pillar, Inc.); Id., pt. 9, at 3080 (1973) (remarks of the Am. Retail Fed'n); Id., pt. 13, at
4319-20 (remarks of Northwest Hotricultural Council). But see Marks & Malingren,
"negotiating Non-Tariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & Poi. INTL Bus. 327, 347-48 (1975).
1d See text at notes 51-53 supra.
"'See text at note 21 supra.
1 " For example, a marginal injury or threat of injury test might be applied to
dutiable goods, whereas a substantial or material injury test might be applied to non-
dutiable merchandise.
ISS See industry remarks in note 225 supra.
H° See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in .93 U.S. CODE CONC. &
An. NEWS 7186, 7320 (1974).iv id.
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iformity arguments, Congress was, nonetheless, unwilling to make a
unilateral concession to principle where it was under no international
legal obligation to do so. In so refusing, Congress no doubt acted in a
manner calculated to strengthen the American negotiating position at
international trade talks. 232
3. Judicial Review
Under the provisions of the new countervailing duty law, Con-
gress had granted American manufacturers the right to judicial review
of negative bounty determinations. 233 This right to review was ex-
plicitly granted "so as to assure effective protection under the counter-
vailing duty laws to American producers ...." 2 " The provision re-
verses, then, the 1971 decision by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in Hammond Lead, which had denied such a right to review. 235
As such, the amendment marks a "return" by Congress to its 1922
posture that American manufacturers should enjoy the same right to
judicial review as has always been available to importers.'"
With the legislative creation of a right to judicial review in the
Customs Court of protests pursuant to section 516, the rationales
supporting the decision in National Milk would seem to be virtually
extinguished.'" The district court's jurisdiction in that case was ini-
tially premised on the unavailability of review in the Customs Court, a
condition which obviously no longer obtains. 238 With respect to its
mandamus jurisdiction, the decision in National Milk was seemingly
predicated on the absence of time restrictions on the bounty determina-
tion process. 239 The institution of such time limits by Congress
would seem, therefore, to have dispelled the condition supporting the
232
 Other countries may be expected to act in a similar manner. See text at notes
256-59 infra.
2" 19 U.S.C.A. § 1516(c) (Supp. 1976). This subsection provides that American
manufacturers and producers may contest the "failure to assess countervailing duties
...." Under 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1970), the Customs Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear appeals from denied protests. These petitions must be filed in accordance with the
procedures outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2631-32 (1970).
234 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. An.
N EWS 7186, 7320 (1974).
235
 See discussion in text at notes 105-11 supra.
238 Section 516 of the Tariff Act of 1922 had explicitly provided that the protest
of a domestic manufacturer might be filed "with the same effect as a protest of a con-
signee filed under the provisions of sections 514 and 515 of this Act." Ch. 356,
§ 516(b), 42 Stat. 971. For a discussion of the legislative intent underlying the sub-
sequent deletion of the phrase see Feltex Corp. v. Dutchess Hat Works, 21 C.C.P.A.
463, 472 (1934) and Note, 4 LAW & Pot. IN -rt. Bus. 146, 150-52 (1972).
237
 Marks & Malingren, Negotiating Non-Tariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL
iNri. Bus. 327, 359-60 n.127, 364 (1975).
'3" See text at notes 156-59 supra. Protests may now be made to the Customs
Court pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1582, 1631-32
(1970).
339 372 F. Supp. at 747.
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court's alternative ground for decision.
There may, however, be future cases of Treasury abuse in ad-
ministration of the statute which would be appropriate instances in
which to confer mandamus jurisdiction upon a federal district court.
One such possibility arises from the lack of time limits within which
the Treasury must act on manufacturers' petitions protesting negative
bounty determinations. 24° In cases where such protests are allowed to
"collect dust," the judicial review in Customs Court which the 1974
Trade Act purports to guarantee would be precluded since no review
could be granted "pursuant" to section 516 until the administrative
remedy had been exhausted."' In such cases of undue administrative
delay, it does not seem unlikely that a federal district court would feel
compelled to conclude that it has jurisdiction. 242 Thus, it would ap-
pear a bit premature to completely write off the ability of federal dis-
trict courts to fashion mandamus relief in countervailing duty cases.
4. Administrative Discretion
The 1974 Amendments contain temporary provisions for execu-
tive discretion in administering section 303 while international trade
negotiations proceed. 243 Under these provisions, the Secretary of the
Treasury is empowered to suspend application of countervailing duty
orders at any time in the four year period following enactment of the
1974 Trade Act. 244 Such suspension is, however, expressly qualified
by three conditions, The Amendments require that:
(A) adequate steps have been taken to reduce substan-
tially or eliminate during such period the adverse effect of
a bounty or grant ...
(B) there is a reasonable prospect that, under section
2112 of [the Trade Act of 1974], successful trade agree-
ments will be entered into with foreign countries or in-
strumentalities providing for the reduction or elimination
of barriers to or other distortions of international trade;
and
(C) the imposition of the additional duty under this
section with respect to such article or merchandise would
'40 Both the 1974 amendments and customs regulations are silent on this point.
Note however that 19 C.F.R. 174.21(a) (1975) sets a two year period from the date a
protest is filed by an importer within which a determination must be reached. It may be
anticipated that the Treasury Department will move to harmonize its regulations such
that importers and domestic manufacturers will be treated similarly.
2" Customs Court review is explicitly conditioned upon a "protest pursuant to
the Tariff Act of 1930." 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1970). If one cannot even invoke the provi-
sions of the 1930 Act, then a protest could hardly be filed pursuant to it.
242 National Milk Prods Fed'n. v. Shultz, 372 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D.D.C. 1974)
(mandamus jurisdiction). See also text at note 196 supra.
' 4 ' 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(d)(1)-(3), (e)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1976).
1' 4 Id. § 1303(d)(2).
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be likely to seriously jeopardize the satisfactory completion
of such negotiations .... 245
All three of these conditions must be met if the Secretary is to exer-
cise executive discretion and suspend application of countervailing
duty orders. 246
 In addition, every such suspension, as well as the
reasons therefore, must be "promptly" transmitted to Congress,'"
where either the House or the Senate, by a majority vote of those pre-
sent, may override the Secretary's resolution and render the mer-
chandise in question subject to countervailing duties. 248
The 1974 Trade Act's provision for executive discretion was
adopted over widespread opposition voiced by domestic interests. 249
Much of this opposition, however, was addressed to the House ver-
sion of the trade reform bill, which had conditioned the exercise of
discretion solely on the prospect that negotiations would be jeop-
ardized, and which had made no provision for congressional review. 25°
Such broad discretion, it was believed, would render the other re-
forms in the countervailing duty law virtually meaningless, since the il-
legitimate result of prior administrative practice—unavailability of the
remedy—would now be legitimated. 25 ' Congressional resolution of
the discretion issue attempts to solve the conflict between the need for
protection from unfair subsidies and the desire for flexibility in inter-
national negotiations."' The exercise of executive discretion is, there-
fore, contingent upon a positive response by the foreign nation to
ameliorate the effects of a trade practice which has been adjudged
2" Id. f 1303(d)(2)(A)-(C).
246 1d. The House bill had not contained all of these limitations, and as such, had
been subject to considerable criticism. See Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the Howe Comm.
on Ways & Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8, at 2817 (1973) (remarks of the National
Livestock Feeders Ass'n) [hereinafter House Hearings on the Trade Act of 1974]; Id., pt.
10, at 3269 (remarks of the Electronic Indus. Ass'n); Id., pt. 7, at 2164-65 (remarks of
the General Electric Co.). But see id., pt. 3, at 1014-15 (remarks of the U.S.-Japan Trade
Council). Congress viewed the statute as a check on potential abuse of the discretion
provision. See S REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186, 7322 (1974).
247 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(e)(2) (Supp. 1976) (reports to Congress).
g45
 Id. The House bill did not contain similar measures. H. CONF. REP. No, 1644,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7390 (1974).
"° See note 246 supra.
2" See S. REP No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. &
• AD. NEWS 7186, 7321 (1974). In commenting on the House bill during hearings on the
Trade Act of 1974 before the House Committee on Ways & Means, the Trade Rela
tions Council of the U.S., Inc. suggested: "If this provision of the bill were to be
enacted, it can be predicted that in few cases, if any, would the Secretary impose coun-
tervailing duties, notwithstanding proof of the bounty or grant being paid by the
foreign government or other foreign interests House Hearings on the Trade Act of
1974, supra note 235, pt. 7, at 2164-65 (emphasis added).
:31 See, e.g., id. (remarks of the Trade Relations Council of the U.S., Inc.).
113
	 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d-Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE GONG. &
AD. NEWS 7186, 7321 (1974).
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unfair. 253
 In this manner, protection from foreign subs'idization prac-
tices can be attained through voluntary elimination of the bounty or
grant at its source, rather than through neutralization of its impact by
means of a protective countervailing duty.
The legislative history of the executive discretion proviso reveals
that Congress contemplated sparing use of this device. 254
 It was be-
lieved that foreign countries should and would be encouraged to
eliminate bounties or grants during the interval between the Treasury
Department's preliminary and final determinations. Congress, there-
fore, felt that the discretionary power granted to the Secretary would
prove unnecessary in many cases.255
 It would seem unlikely, however,
that foreign sovereigns will share American perceptions of' their trade
practices as unethical, and unilaterally move to curb them. 256
 Support
for this view may be garnered from both the nature of subsidization
practices, as well as from the dynamics of the international negotiation
process. First, many subsidization decisions by other nations represent
a political decision to aid a particular sector of their economy. 2"
Often, such assistance is only provided to enable products to compete
in world markets, rather than to confer any competitive advantage. 253
It would seem unrealistic to expect a nation to condemn practices thus
motivated as "unethical" in the absence of an international consensus
that they are indeed unfair. Secondly, with international negotiations
concerning fair trade practices in progress, it is unlikely that a country
would in any way prejudice or compromise its own negotiating posi-
tion by conceding that its subsidization practices are unfair in advance
of formal multilateral condemnation. Given the likelihood of other
nations assuming such a reluctant posture in the face of a Treasury
Department finding that a bounty exists and that countervailing
duties are warranted, resort to the exercise of discretion will, in all
likelihood, occur more frequently than anticipated by Congress. The
results of current administrative practice appear to confirm precisely
this conclusion. 253
253
 19 U.S.C.A, 1303(d) (2) (A) (Supp• 1976),
2" See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. Cont. CoNo. &
An. NEws 7186, 7322 (1974).
15 ' Id.
256 1t is more likely that the affected nations will view American countervailing
duty impositions as indicative of a move by the U.S, toward a "protectionist" foreign
trade posture. Brazil, for example, has responded in this manner to countervailing
duties imposed on its goods. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1976, at 2, col. 5 (city ed.).
257
 Feller suggests that "government assistance to. entrepreneurs for the purpose
of promoting regional development, reducing unemployment, encouraging plant and
equipment modernization, or fostering national self-sufficiency in particular
industries—all recognized as legitimate government functions—could technically come
within the ambit of 303 without regard to their effect on exports." Feller, supra note
225, at 27.
"' Id. at 22.
"' See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 21719, 21720 (1975) (waiver of countervailing duties on
dairy products from member states of the European Economic Community); Id. at
55638, 55639 (waiver of countervailing duties on canned ham and shoulders from the
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B. Effects of the Amendments
The amendments under the 1974 Trade Act do not address the
existing confusion regarding what constitutes a "bounty or grant."
While numerous domestic groups advocated the adoption of amend-
ments defining these terms,26 ° Congress left it to the President to
"seek through negotiations the establishment of internationally agreed
rules and procedures governing the use of subsidies . . . and the applica-
tion of countervailing duties."2 " During the interim period pending
the achievement of such an international consensus, domestic con-
cerns will necessarily look to old and new Treasury and judicial deci-
sions in attempts to glean support for their contentions that particular
subsidization practices are, in fact, bounties or grants. Treasury deci-
sions will continue to provide little assistance, however, for even
under the new publication requirements, the Treasury Department is
still not required to specify the reasons underlying either its negative
or positive responses to the issue of whether a bounty or a grant
exists. 262 The continuation of this practice will hinder, as
previously, 263 both those seeking a clear understanding of administra-
tive construction of the phrase, as well as those who seek to support
or protest particular Treasury determinations in an intelligent
manner. 264
 Thus, while the Treasury is obliged under the new
amendments to explain its reasoning to Congress if it exercises its dis-
cretionary powers to suspend duties,265 it need not publicly explain its
bounty determinations. 266 Absent judicial challenge and the resultant
elucidation provided through opinions, 2" there will remain little
guidance offered to the public as to which foreign trade practices may
legitimately be protested under the countervailing duty law. 268
member states of the European Economic Community); 41 Fed. Reg. 1274, 1275 (1976)
(waiver of countervailing duties on cheese from Australia); Id. at 1467, 1468 (waiver of
countervailing duties on cheese from Switzerland); Id. at 1587, 1588 (waiver of counter-
vailing duties on rubber footwear from S. Korea).
"8 Many definitions' were proposed by domestic concerns at the hearings before
the House Ways and Means Committee. See, e.g., Hearings on the Trade Act of 1974, supra
note 246, pt. 9, at 3097-98 (suggestions by the Pulp and Paper Mach. Mfrs. Ass'n); id.,
pt. 10, at 3296 (Electronic Indus. Ass'n); id., pt. 9, at 3075, 3079-80 (Am. Retail Fed'n).
26 ' 19 U.S.C.A.	 1303(d)(1) (Supp. 1976).
262
 Id. § 1303(a)(5). This subsection provides: "[Ohe Secretary shall from time to
time ascertain and determine, or estimate, the net amount of each such bounty or
grant, and shall declare the net amount so determined or estimated." Id.
I" See text at notes 63-67 supra.
264 Cf. Butler, supra note 225, at 131-32.
783
 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(e)(1) (Supp. 1976).
268 Customs regulation provide for a limited disclosure to interested parties. See
19 C.F.R. §§ 103.8(a), (b)(viii), 103.10 and 175.21(6) (1975). Requests under the Free-
dom of Information Act may also be fruitful in securing nonprivileged documents. See
5 U.S.C. 552(a), (b) (1970). Neither method, however, offers the broad public dis-
closure that would be afforded by publication in the Federal Register.
267 See note 75 supra and authorities cited therein.
"8 For a description of' the categories of practices usually incurring countervail-
ing duties or generally regarded as subsidies by legal scholars, see note 75 supra.
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While there are significant negative aspects to the dearth of con-
gressional guidance as to what constitutes a "bounty or grant," this
very absence of a government provided definition may, in fact, pro-
vide a broad remedial opportunity to domestic concerns. Through the
very inexactitude of the concept, it is left to the dictates of private in-
terest to seek to give it content. Toward this end, the language of the
Supreme Court in Downs 266 and Nieho/as 27° provide unchallenged au-
thority for an expansive construction of the phrase "bounty or grant."
A wide-open door then, is available to domestic manufacturers and
producers through which to seek to have foreign subsidization prac-
tices declared illegal. Furthermore, just as Congress has left it to the
executive branch to negotiate international agreements with respect to
subsidization practices, 2 " it has also left it to the private sector to seek
to influence the positions taken by American negotiators at the cur-
rent trade talks with regard to proscribed "bounties or grants." 272
This is possible because in persuading the Treasury Department that
a trade practice is unfair and illegal, a domestic manufacturer equally
addresses the representatives of nations who are now creating the
very guidelines by which future international trade practice will be
governed.
The opportunity, however, is one of limited duration. Since
Congress has sought to create incentives to expedite executive at-
tempts to reach international accords, 273 it has consequently limited
the time in which domestic concerns may seek to influence the execu-
tive branch in its negotiations. As the trade talks are currently in
progress, arguments as to the fairness or unfairness of foreign sub-
sidization practices had best be made now, for the future may well
prove too late.
The 1974 Amendments have also had a significant impact upon
the decision-making process with respect to countervailing duty im-
positions. The nature of determinations with respect to such imposi-
tions has traditionally evidenced a tension between its adjudicative and
political aspects."' Since the law was explicitly mandatory in its
terms,275 past administration of the countervailing duty statute inte-
grated both aspects into the determination of the existence of a
bounty or grant. 276
 The 1974 Amendments relieve this tension by
200 See text at notes 133-35 supra.
2" See text at note 142 supra.
271 See note 54 supra. See also S. REP, No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93
U.S. Cons: CONG. & An. NEWS 7186, 7318, 7321 (1974).
272 Through the complaint and countervailing duty imposition process, domestic
manufacturers send an explicit message to the Treasury Department as to the nature of
foreign trade practices which they regard as unfair.
474
	 example, the discretionary power to suspend a countervailing duty
imposition is.limited to the four year period beginning on the date of enactment or the
Trade Act of 1974. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(d)(2) (Supp. 1976).
z" See Hammond Lead, 440 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
2 " Ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935-36, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
272 See Hammond Lead, 440 F.2d 1024, 1030-31 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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creating a new two-phase imposition process which completely sepa-
rates these aspects. The first, or bounty determination phase, is fun-
damentally adjudicative in nature. As suggested by the court in
American Express, it is the Treasury Department's function in determin-
ing the existence of a "bounty or grant" to simply examine the chal-
lenged practice to determine if a bounty or grant exists as a matter of
fact. 277 The element of discretion is completely removed from this
stage of the decisional process. As such, administrative application of
the law to the facts presents a justiciable issue' 78
 and review of nega-
tive determinations in the United States Customs Court is, therefore,
provided. 2 "
The second phase of the new process for imposing countervail-
ing duties relates to the decision of whether or not to assess a coun-
tervailing duty once it has been established that a bounty or grant ex-
ists. At this stage, the Secretary of the Treasury's discretion in the ap-
plication of sanctions enters the picture. The nature of the question, of
nwhether or not to impose additional duties is essentially political in a .-
ture, for it addresses the continuing conflict between protective in-
terests based on a unilateral perception of the "unfairness" of particu-
lar subsidization practices, and the desire to internationalize percep-
tions of what constitute unethical trade practices.'" While this second
stage recognizes the political considerations, it establishes three condi-
tions, set out above,2 " which must be met in order for the Secretary
to suspend application of additional duties."' There are, however, no
objective standards by which the Secretary's determination is to be
judged. Consequently, considerable latitude in such determinations
will probably be afforded by the statutory language utilized.'" A deci-
sion to invoke the discretion provision is, nevertheless, subject to re-
view by Congress,'"' where the Secretary's reasons must prove persua-
sive to avoid imposition of the otherwise mandatory countervailing
duties.'as Thus, under the 1974 reforms, such political decisions have
been removed from exclusive executive jurisdiction, which had been
unilaterally assumed by the Secretary under past administrative
practice. 288
m 472 F.2d 1050, 1055-56 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
"" See id. at 1056. See also 5 U.S.C. ** 701, 702, 704, 706 (1970).
l'a 28 U.S.C. * 1582 (1970). Such review may be taken from negative bounty de-
terminations pursuant to the 1930 Tariff Act, as amended by the 1974 Trade Act. 19
U.S.C.A. 1516(c) (Supp. 1976).
"° See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. Cook: CONG. &
An. NEws 7186, 7320-21 (1974).
'a' See text at note 245 supra.
I" 19 U.S.C.A. * 1303(d) (2) (A)-(C) (Supp. 1976).
183 See id.
"" Id. 1303(e).
'" Id.	 1303(e)(2).
166 See Hammond Lead, 440 F.2d 1024, 1030, 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1971). See also S. REP,
No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 93 U.S. CODE CONG. & Au NEWS 7186, 7318,
7321 (1979).
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As an adjunct to the new two-step process for imposing counter-
vailing duties, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 287 provides for
limited Presidential discretion. In instances where duties imposed
under section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 are inadequate to deter
foreign subsidization practices, the President "may impose duties or
other import restrictions on the products of such foreign
countries ... for such time as he deems appropriate." 288 Section 301
mandates, however, that the President "take all appropriate and feasi-
ble steps within his power to obtain the elimination of
such ... [foreign] subsidies ...." 28 " Presidential action taken pursuant
to section 301 is subject to Congressional scrutiny; 2 " 0 an affirmative
vote of a majority of those present.in each House of Congress on a
concurrent resolution of disapproval will render section 301 action
inoperative.2"t
The 1974 Trade Act, then, subjects the exercise of executive dis-
cretion, whether by the President 292 or by the Secretary of the
Treasury, 2" to a check by Congress. Final decisions on the imposition
of countervailing duties and similar retaliatory checks have thus been
"returned" to the halls of Congress in keeping with the Constitution's
mandate. 2 " 4 While the continued influence of the Department of State
will no doubt be felt in Congress' decisional process, participation by
the public, through its elected representatives, is finally possible in de-
termining an appropriate political response to harmful unfair foreign
trade practices.
Finally, the 1974 amendments have had a major effect upon the
very function of United States countervailing duty law. At the incep-
tion of this law, these duties acted as a "repair mechanism" designed
2" 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (Supp. 1976). For a discussion of section 301, see Hudec,
Retaliation Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301 and GATT
Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461, 510-39 (1975).
*" 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(c)(3) (Supp. 1976). Presidential actions pursuant to section
301 arc further conditioned on a finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that sub-
sidies or incentives having the effect of subsidies, are provided by a country or instru-
mentality on its exports, as well as a finding by the International Trade Commission
that such exports "have the effect of substantially reducing sales of the competitive
United States product ... ." Id. § 2411(c)(1), (2). An example of such restrictive action
may be found in President Ford's recent decision to impose import quotas on stainless
and other specialty steels. imposition of these quotas was suspended, however, for
ninety days pending "an effort to negotiate an 'orderly marketing agreement' with the
main foreign supplying countries." N.Y. Times, March 17, 1976, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
2" 19 U.S.C.A. § 241(a)(B) (Supp. 1976). President Ford's recent decision to seek
a special world trade agreement covering all international trade in steel at the current
international trade negotiations in Geneva is illustrative of such action. N.Y. Times,
March 17, 1976, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.).
"° 19 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (Supp. 1976).
1" Id. § 2412(b).
222 /d.
293
 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(e)(2) (Supp. 1976).
2" U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, which provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ...."
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to preserve the protection of domestic tariff walls. 292 As such, they
had a basically anticompetitive thrust. 2" However, under the GATT,
there has been a worldwide movement toward freer trade, with con-
sequent attempts to reduce and eliminate tariff and nontariff trade
barriers. Today, countervailing duties neither seek to preserve such
barriers, nor do they themselves represent harriers. 297 While remain-
ing protective in nature, these duties are no longer "protectionist,"
for they seek only to compensate for subsidization practices which
would otherwise confer unfair economic advantage and distort trade
patterns. The new countervailing duty law, then, seeks to protect free
competition from unfair distortion, rather than to preserve competi-
tive restriction through "protectionist" barriers.
The transformation in theoretical function of countervailing duty
law is completed by the extension of such duties to otherwise non-
dutiable items. 2 " Whereas formerly the duty-free or dutiable status of
goods impacted upon countervailing duties as a restrictive trade
device, 299 such distinctions can no longer affect a device whose new
function is to insure that all products compete according to relative
merit. Thus, even within the framework of current liberal trade
policies, there would seem to remain a place, if not an expanding
role, for countervailing duties.
CONCLUSION
Section 331 of the Trade Act of 1974 has substantially
strengthened the existing substantive and procedural provisions of the
United States' countervailing duty law. In establishing time limits for
action on complaints by the Treasury Department, extending the
statute's reach to nondutiable goods, and ensuring judicial review of
negative determinations to domestic manufacturers, Congress has
provided American business with a renewed and ,expanded remedy
for unfair foreign trade practices which tend to undermine the com-
petitive underpinnings of domestic markets. As such, countervailing
duties have been returned to the realm of domestic economic policy,
and rendered less of an adjunct to diplomacy. Whether this transfer
can be effectuated without counterproductive international repercus-
sions remains to be seen, for the establishment of equitable interna-
tional trade relations will ultimately depend upon whether or not na-
tions can harmonize divergent perceptions of the fairness of subsidiza-
295 See text at notes 19-20 supra.
1 °6 Feller, supra note 225, at 22.
297 See Butler, supra note 225, at 83; Note, The Michelin Decision: A Possible New
Direction for U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 6 LAW & Put.. 1N-m.. Bus. 237, 242 (1974).
1 °1 See Feller, supra note 225, at 24.
299 See text at notes 21-22 supra.
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tion practices. Only through such consonance will strengthened
economic relations develop between foreign nations and the United
States in the form of open and nondiscriminatory world trade.
PHILIP D. O'NEILL, JR.
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